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ABSTRACT 
We  review  arguments  for  and  against  reserve  requirements  and  conclude 
that  the  main  question  is  whether  a  distinction between  money  creation 
and  intermediation can be  made.  We  argue  that  such  a  distinction can  be 
made  in  a  money-in-advance  economy  and  show  that  if  the  the  money-in-
advance  constraint  is universally binding  then  reserve  requirements  on 
checkable  accounts  have  no  effect  on  intermediaiton.  We  then  proceed  to 
show  that  in  a  model  in  which  trade  is  uncertain  and  sequential,  a 
fractional  reserve  banking  system  gives  rise  to  endogenous  monetary 
shocks.  These  endogenous  monetary  shocks  lead  to  fluctuations  in 
capacity utilization and  waste.  When  the  money-in-advance  constraint  is 
universally  binding,  a  100%  reserve  requirement  on  checkable  accounts 
can eliminate this waste. 
*  The  University of  Haifa.  We  would  like to  thank Larry Christiano, 
Marty Eichenbaum,  Bob  Lucas  and Art Rolnik  for  useful discussions  and 
comments  on  a  previous version of  this paper. 2 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
There  seems  to be  an  ongoing  trend  towards  decreasing reserve 
requirements.  For  example,  in  the  US  the ratio of  required reserves  to 
checkable deposits  decreased  from  about  20%  in the early fifties  to  less 
than  10%  in the early ninties.  (See  Barro  [1993]  page  462).  Surprisingly 
enough  there is very little discussion of  this policy trend.  Text-books 
try to provide  some  explanation.  For  example,  Barro  (1993,  page  478) 
argues  that high reserve  requirements  are associated with  a  large spread 
between borrowing  and  lending rates  and  less  intermediation between 
borrowers  and  lenders.  As  a  result resource allocation becomes  less 
efficient. 
On  the  other hand,  Friedman  (1959)  argues  that reserve 
requirements  do  not affect intermediation.  He  envisaged that under  100% 
reserve  requirement  there wi11  be  two  institutions.  One  that stores 
deposits  and provides  checking services  for  a  fee  and  one  that does  the 
intermediation between  lenders  and  borrowers.!  Friedman  recommends  100% 
reserve  requirement  to  improve  the control  of  the  money  supply and 
reduce  fluctuations  in real  output. 
!  In describing  "how  a  100%  reserves  would work",  Friedmans  says  (page 
69-70)  "The  effect of  this proposal  would  be  to  require our present 
commercial  banks  to divide  themselves  into  two  separate institutions. 
One  would  be  a  pure depository institution,  a  literal warehouse  for 
money.  It would accept deposits  payable  on  demand  or  transferable by 
check ....  The  other institution that would  be  formed  would  be  an 
investment  trust or brokarage  firm.  It would acquire capital by 
selling shares  or debentures  and would use  the capital  to make  loans 
or acquire  investments." 3 
These  seemingly conflicting views  can be  reconciled if we 
distinguish between  intermediation and money  creation.  This  distinction 
can be  clearly made  in money-in-advance  economies  in which  demand 
(checkable)  deposits  may  be used to satisfy the  money~in-advance 
constraint while  time  deposits  do  not satisfy the money-in-advance 
constraint.  In such  economies it matters  whether  reserve requirements 
are  imposed on  demand  or  time deposits.  In the first part of  the paper 
we  argue that reserve  requirements  on  time  deposits act like a  tax on 
intermediation and distort the allocation of  resources.  Reserve 
requirements  on  demand  deposits act like a  tax on  the creation of  inside 
money and  in the absence  of uncertainty,  have  no  effect on  the 
allocation of  resources. 
In the  second part we  consider  a  money-in-advance  economy with 
uncertain and sequential  trade to study the effects of reserve 
requirements  on  output  fluctuations.  In this model  a  fractional  reserve 
banking  system leads  to uncertainty about  the currency to deposit ratio 
and to  fluctuations  in the money  supply and real output. 
The  money-in-advance  model  can  thus  be  used to support Friedman's 
proposal  for  100%  reserve  requirements  on  demand  deposits.  However,  a 
money-in-advance  model  in which  some  buyers  can circumvent  the money-in-
advance  constraint  (by using credit cards,  for  example)  may  change  this 
conclusion.  We  discuss  this possibility as  well  as  other models  which 
have  been used  to argue  against  Friedman's  proposal  in the last 
sections. 4 
2.  THE  EFFECT  OF  RESERVE  REQUIREMENTS  ON  INTERMEDIATION 
We  assume  that  demand  deposits  can be  used to satisfy the money-
in-advance  constraint  on  consumption while  time  deposits  cannot.  Using 
this definition we  argue  that reserve  requirements  on  time  deposits  may 
indeed affect  intermediation but  reserve  requirements  on  demand  deposits 
are neutral.  The  first point was  demonstrated by Chari,  Jones  and 
Manuelli  (1995).2  We  now  demonstrate  the  second point by an  example. 
There are  two  representative agents  in the  economy.  Each agent  is 
endowed with  one unit of  labor every other period.  The  agents  are 
infinitely lived with preferences  given by:  Lt  ~t u(Ct),  where 
o <  ~  <  1  is the discount  factor,  Ct  is consumption at  time  t  and u(  ) 
is  a  strictly concave  single period utility function. 
There  is  a  single  firm which  converts  labor  into consumption  good 
at  a  rate of  one  for  one.  It hires  labor  and  pays  money  wages  at the  end 
of  the period,  after selling its output at the price  Pt  for  money-in-
advance.  It pays  the entire revenues  of  M1  dollars  to  the worker. 
For  simplicity,  it is assumed  that  there are  only  two  assets: 
demand  deposits  (DD)  and  time  deposits  (TD).  The  interest rates  on 
loans,  i L,  on  time  deposits,  iT'  and  demand  deposits,  i D,  are constant 
over  time.  The  evolution of assets  is given by: 
2  Chari,  Jones  and Manuelli  (1995)  use  a  cash-in-advance model  in which 
there is  a  special  kind of  capital  that  can  be  bought  only with  bank 
loans.  In their model  bank  loans  are  financed  by deposits  which are 
subject  to reserve  requirements  but  these deposits  cannot  be  used  to 
satisfy the  cash-in-advance constraint  on  consumption  (their equation 
[25]).  According  to  our definition,  these are  time  deposits. 5 
where  h  indexes  the  individual,  t  indexes  time,  L  is  the  amount  of 
loans,  W is the wage  payment  (=  Ml  for  the agent  who  worked last period 
and  zero  otherwise)  P  is the dollar price of  consumption  and  c  is  the 
quanitity of  consumption.  All  the magnitudes  in  (1)  are non-negative. 
In addition to  (1),  agents  face  a  money-in-advance  constraint. 
They  use  checks  only  (no  cash)  so  that: 
(2 ) 
Agent  h  chooses  (Lt,  TDt,  DDt,  Ct)  to  solve: 
(3 ) 
s. t.  (1), 
h  h  h 
(2),  initial values  of:  La  '  TDa  '  DDa  and non-negativity 
constraints. 
There  is  a  price taking  bank which  chooses  the  amounts  of  loans 
(L),  reserves  (R),  time  deposits  (TD)  and  demand  deposits  (DD)  subject 
to  the balance  sheet identity: 
(4)  L  +  R  TD  +  DD 
and  the reserve  requirement: 6 
(5 )  R  ~ rrDD  +  £TD, 
where rr is the  reserve ratio  for  demand  deposits  and  £  is  the  reserve 
ratio  for  time  deposits.  We  assume  £  ~ rr.  The  bank  chooses 
(L,  TD,  DD,  R)  to  solve  the  following  problem: 
(6 ) 
(7) 
max  (1  +  iL)L  +  R  - (1  +  iT)TD  - (1  +  ic)DD 
s . t  ( 4)  and  (5). 
Interior solution to  the bank's  problem requires3 : 
Since  £  ~ rr,  at the solution to  the  consumer's  problem  (3)  the 
money-in-advance  constraint  (~)  holds  with equality.  This  allows  for  an 
easy comparison of  the cost of  current  consumption which  the borrower 
faces  to  the  cost which  the  lender  faces. 
A  borrower  who  wants  to  consume  an additional unit  today,  will 
borrow  Pt dollars  and deposit it in demand  deposit.  At  the beginning of 
next period he  will  have  Pt(l  +  iL  - ic)  dollars  less.  A  lender  who 
wants  to  consume  an additional unit  today,  will  transfer  Pt  dollars  from 
time  to  demand  deposit  and will  therefore have,  at the beginning of next 
3  A  fraction  (1  - £)  of  a  dollar  in  time  deposits will  earn  a  gross 
interest of  (1  +  i L)  and  a  fraction  £ will earn  a  gross  interest of  1. 
Therefore  an  interior finite solution requires: 
(1  +  iT)  (1  +  i L) (1  £)  +  £.  For  the  same  reason: 
(1  +  ic)  (1  +  i L)(l  rr)  +  rr. 7 
period,  Pt(l  +  iT  - i D)  dollars  less.  When  £  = 0  the  change  in the  asset 
position ·of  both is the  same,  and  therefore both  face  the  same  cost of 
current  consumption  in terms  of  future  consumption.  Furthermore,  since 
changes  in rr do  not affect the difference between  iL  and  iT,  such 
changes  do  not  introduce  a  wedge  between  the  relative price of current 
consumption which  is  faced  by  the borrower  and  the relative price which 
is  faced  by  the  lender. 
To  illustrate the working  of  the  system and  to distinguish between 
loans  which create inside money  and  loans  which  take part in the 
intermediation process,  we  now  discuss  a  steady state equilibrium. 
In the  steady state each agent  chooses  (L,  TD,  DD,  c)  when 
receiving salary and  (L*,  TD*,  DD*,  c*)  when  not  receiving salary.  The 
bank holds  the entire stock of outside money  (H  dollars)  as  reserves. 
This  stock does  not  change  over  time.  Agents  owe  the bank  the  Ml  - H 
dollars necessary to create inside money.  In addition an  agent  may  take 
a  loan  financed by  the  time  deposit  of  the other agent  for  consumption 
smoothing purposes.  We  now  define  a  steady state equilibrium and  solve 
an  example. 
A  steady state equilibrium is  a  vector 
(P,  R,  i L,  iT,  i D,  L,  TD,  DD,  c,  L*,  TD*,  DD*,  c*)  such that: 
(a)  Given  the  interest rates  (iL,  iT,  i D),  the strategy of  choosing  the 
vector  (L,  TD,  DD,  c)  when  receiving salary and  the vector 
(L*,  TD*,  DD*,  c*)  when  not  receiving salary maximizes  the  consumer 
problem  (3)  for  the initial conditions: 
h  *  h  DDO  = DD  ,  LO  *  h  *  Land TDO  =  TD  for  the agent  who  receives  salary in 
the  first period  (t = 1)  and 
h  h 
DDO  = DD,  LO 
agent  who  does  not  receive salary at  t  1; 
h 
Land  TDO  TD  for  the 8 
(b)  Given  the  interest rates  (iL,  iT,  i D),  the vector 
(L  +  L*,  TD  +  TD*,  DD  +  DD*,  R)  solves  the bank's  problem  (6); 
(c)  R  = H  (outside money),  P  = DD  +  DD*  and  c  +  c*  = 1. 
We  now  show that in the  absence  of  reserve  requirements  on  time 
deposits,  there exists  a  steady state equilibrium in which  consumption 
is perfectly smooth. 
Claim:  Assume  that there is no  reserve  requirement  on  time  deposits 
(£  = 0).  Then  there exists  a  steady state equilibrium in which: 
P  =  H/rr  =  M1; 
(1  rr) (1/~  - 1) 
c  = c*  1/2 
DD  =  DD*  (1/2) H/rr 
L  =  (1/2) (1  - rr) (H/rr)  (1/2) (M1  - H) 
TD  (1/2)  [~/ (1+~) 1 (H/rr) 
TD*  =  O. 
Note  that  in the  steady state both agents  owe  the  bank  a  loan of 
(1/2) (M1  - H)  which is necessary to  create inside money.  The  agent  who 
does  not  receive  salary owes  the  bank  an additional  amount  which is 
equal  to  the  amount  that  the other agent  has  in time  deposit.  When 
rr  =  1,  the  inside money  component  of  the  loan  to  the  bank  disappears 
and we  are left with  the  intermediaiton component  which  does  the  job of 
smoothing  consumption. 9 
To  show  the  Claim let td = TD  - Land td*  = TD*  - L*  denote  the 
net position in non-checkable  accounts.  According  to  the  steady state 
strategy,  the evolution of  td and  td*  is given by: 
(8 )  H/rr  +  td*/P  +  (~2) (1  - rr) (l/P  - l)H/rr, 
(9 )  td/P  +  (1/2) (1  - rr) (l/P  - l)H/rr. 
Where  these equations  are derived  from  (1)  after substituting 
h  h  PtCt  = DDt  =  (l/2)H/rr and  Wt  = H/rr when  receiving salary. 
The  solution to  these  equations  is given by: 
(10)  td 
(11)  td*  (1/2) [-p./ (l+P)  - (1  - rr) J (H/rr). 
The  existence of  a  solution to  equations  (8)  and  (9)  implies  that 
the present value  of  consumption at  each point in  time  is equal  to  the 
wealth at that point.  since  the  consumption  is the  same  for  both agents 
it follows  that  the  beginning  of period wealth is  the  same  for  both 
agents  and  in particular,  it does  not  depend  on whether  the agent 
receives  salary this period.  This  occurs  because  an  agent  who  receives 
salary is in debt. 
Since  the  smooth  consumption path  c  = c*  = 1/2  is feasible  and its 
present value  is equal  to wealth,  it is also optimal  in the  sense  of 
maximizing  (3).  We  have  thus  shown  that  there exists  a  steady state 10 
equilibrium allocation which  is  independent  of  reserve  requirements  on 
demand  deposits. 
3.  THE  EFFECT  OF  RESERVE  REQUIREMENTS  ON  OUTPUT  FLUCTUATIONS 
Friedman  (1959)  argues  that high reserve  requirements  allow  for 
better control  of  the money  supply and  therefore reduce  output 
fluctuations.  We  examine  this hypothesis  within the  framework  of 
uncertain and sequential  trade  (UST)  models. 
It has  been  shown  (Eden  [1994),  Lucas  and  Woodford  [1994)  and 
Bental  and  Eden  [1996))  that  exogenous  fluctuations  in the money  supply 
lead to waste.  Here  we  demonstrate  a  similar proposition for  the  case  in 
which  the  fluctuations  in the  money  supply  (M1)  arise endogenously as  a 
result of  fluctuations  in the  demand  for  cash. 
In the spirit of  Lucas  and  Stokey  (1987),  we  assume  that  goods 
have  to  be purchased with money.  However,  the definition of money 
differs across  buyers.  Buyers  who  stay in their  own  neighborhood  can pay 
with either cash or checks.  Buyers  who  travel  to other neighborhoods 
must  use  cash.  Checkable  deposits  can  thus  be  used to satisfy the  money-
in-advance  constraint  for  non-travelers  and  therefore  checkable deposits 
will  be  demanded  by  them. 
In  the model,  the  fraction of  buyers  who  stay in their  own 
neighborhood  is  random.  Therefore,  in a  fractional  reserve  system,  there 
is uncertainty about  the  currency/deposit ratio and  about  M1.  This 
uncertainty about  the  money  supply has  real effects because  of  the 
sequential nature  of  trade  in the  goods  market  and  the  fact  that prices 
at each stage of  the  trading process  cannot  depend  on  information which 11 
will be  revealed at  the  end  of  the process.  From  the point of view  of  a 
typical seller,  dollars arrive in batches.  The  seller,  who  does  not  know 
how  many  batches will arrive,  makes  a  contingent plan which  specifies 
the  amount  that will be  sold in exchange  for  each batch of dollars.  The 
amount  actually sold depends  on  the  number  of  batches  that arrive.  Goods 
which  are not  sold are lost.  Since  the  total  amount  produced will  be 
sold only if Ml  attains its maximal  value,  uncertainty about  Ml  causes 
waste. 
3.1  The  model 
We  consider  a  discrete  time  economy with infinitely lived 
households.  Each  household consists  of  two  members:  a  worker  and  a 
buyer.  The  households  evenly populate  two  identical  islands.  Households 
turn out  to be  one  of  three  types.  Some  households  will  consume  at  the 
current period and  some  will not.  Out  of  the households  who  will  consume 
in the  current period some  will  shop  in their home  island and  some  will 
travel  to  the  other  island. 
To  simplify,  we  assume  that  a  constant  fraction,  a,  of  the 
households  are  non-consumers. 
-
A  random  fraction $  of  the households  which  do  consume,  shop  in 
their home  island.  This  fraction is an  identically and  independently 
distributed random variable,  which  takes  S  possible realizations: 
o  <  ~1  <  ~2  <  ...  <  ~s·  The  probability that  $  =  ~s'  is denoted by  TIs 
- and  the probability that  $  ~ $s  is denoted  by qs.  The  identity of  the 
households  who  belong  to  each  type  is determined every period by an 
i.i.d.  lottery. 12 
All  agents  first trade  in  a  securities market.  Then  they go  to  a 
bank  and  learn their type.  Finally,  they go  to  the  goods  market  and 
learn the price  (market)  at which  they can  buy. 
Travelers  can use  only cash to  buy  goods.  Non-travelers  can use 
checks  and cash to  buy  goods.  In equilibrium,  with  a  fractional  reserve 
banking  system,  only non-travelers will use  checks  and  therefore  the 
amount  of  inside money  depends  on  the  number  of non-travelers. 
Accordingly,  total purchasing power  (M1)  depends  on  the realization of 
-
~. 
We  start from  describing  the arrival of purchasing power  from  the 
sellers'  point  of view. 
3.2  Firms 
From  the point of view of  the  representative  firm,  demand arrives 
sequentially in batches.  The  number  of batches  that will arrive is 
denoted by  the  random variable s,  where  s  takes  values  from  1  to  S.  The 
amount  of dollars  in each batch is determined endogenously.  The  number 
of  batches  that will  arrive depends  on  the  realization of  ~.  In 
-
particular,  the probability that  s  = sis:  Ds  = prob(~ = ~s).  The  only 
information that is revealed by  the arrival  of  batch  j  is  that  s  ~ j. 
The  representative  firm hires  labor,  1,  and produces  according  to 
a  linear production  function  k  = 1,  where  k  denotes  total capacity. 
Units  of  capacity can  be  costlessly converted to units  of  output at the 
rate of  one  to  one. 13 
The  firm  knows  that it can sell to batch  s  at the price P(s),  if 
batch  s  arrives.  It makes  a  contingent plan:  k(s)  units  of  output will 
be  sold to batch  s  if it arrives.  Unsold units are wasted. 
We  say that  the arrival of  the first batch opens  the first market. 
The  arrival of  each additional batch opens  an additional market.  Using 
this  language,  the  firm allocates total  supply among  the  S  potential 
markets.  Thus, 
(12)  I  LS  k(s). 
Units  allocated to market  j  bring P(j)  dollars if market  j  opens 
and  zero if it does  not.  The  nominal  revenue if exactly s  markets  open 
is: 
(13)  y(s)  Lj  ~s  P ( j  ) k ( j  ) . 
At  the beginning of  the period there are  complete markets  for 
contingent  claims,  to be  described below.  The  price at the  beginning of 
the period of  a  dollar that will be  delivered at the  end of  the period 
if exactly s  markets  open is ns.  The  nominal  wage  is given by Wand is 
paid at the beginning of  the period. 
The  firm chooses  k(s)  to maximize  the present value of profits.  It 
solves: 14 
(14) 
s.t. 
3.3  Banks 
max  Y 
y(s)  =  Lj~s P(j)k(j) 
1  = Ls  k(s) 
k(s)  ~  O. 
The  representative bank  faces  three interest rates:  iD  for 
checkable deposits,  iT  for  time  deposits  and  iL  for  loans. 
Let  DD(s),  TD(s)  and  LL(s)  denote  the  amounts  of  checkable 
(demand)  deposits,  time  deposits  and  loans  that  the bank  has  in state s. 
The  bank's profits  in state  s  are given by: 
(15)  z(s) 
Let, 
(16 )  z 
denote  the  expected value of  the  corresponding quantities  when  using 
"risk neutral probabilities".  (We  later  show  that  in equilibrium ns  = Ds 
and  these  are  standard mathematical  expectations). 
While  banks  cannot  observe  the state s  at the  time  they operate, 
they can still control  the expected values  D,  T  and  L.  This  assumption 
is motivated by  the  following  Bertrand type  argument.  We  assume  that if 
the  bank sets  the market  interest rates it will get  the market  average 15 
quantities.  By  deviating slightly from  the market  rates  and  setting 
appropriate quantity limits,  a  bank  can attract any  amount  it wants. 
There  is  a  regulator who  can  infer  from  the  operating procedures 
of  the  bank  the  expected values  (16).  It is  assumed  that  the  regulator 
imposes  an  "average"  reserve  requirement  on  demand  deposits4 : 
(17)  (D  +  T  - L) /D  ~  rr, 
where  0  <  rr  ~ 1  is the average  reserve  requirement.  There  is no 
reserve  requirement  on  time  deposits.  The  bank  chooses  D,  T  and  L  to 
solve: 
s.t.  (17)  and non-negativity 
constraints. 
In equilibrium,  iL  ~ iD  and  therefore  (17)  will hold with 
equality.  Substituting  (17)  into  (18)  allows  us  to write  the profit of 
the  bank  as: 
(19 ) 
In equilibrium D  and  T  must  be  finite  and positive and  therefore: 
(20 )  (1  - rr)iL 
4  In practice,  central  banks  control  reserve  requirement  by  computing 
periodic averages. 16 
3.4  Households 
The  objective  function of  the household  is given by 
(21) 
where  Ct  is consumption at time  t,  9t  is an i.i.d.  random variable that 
may  take  the value of  1  (if the household wants  to  consume)  and  0 
(otherwise)  and  0  <  ~ <  1  is a  discount  factor.  The  single period 
utility function u(  is differentiable and strictly concave with 
u ' (0)  =  ~.  The  amount  of  consumption  depends  on  the realizations of 
- three  shocks:  the aggregate  shock,  (St),  the  (idiosyncratic)  market  at 
which  the buyer participates  (jt  ~ St)  and  the  (idiosyncratic)  type of 
- the  household  (tt).  The  type  of  the household is determined both by its 
desire  to  consume  and  the  traveling status of  the buyer.  The  buyer  is of 
type  0  if he wants  to  consume  (9  = 1)  and he  is non-traveler,  he  is of 
type  1  if he wants  to  consume  and he  travels and of  type  2  if he  does 
not want  to  consume  (9  =  0). 
The  household starts the period with At  dollars.  It owns  a  firm 
and  a  bank which  are valued at Yt  and  Zt dollars,  respectively.  It sells 
(inellastically)  a  unit of  labor  for  Wt  dollars.  It first goes  to  the 
securities market  and  buys  or sells  (from and  to  the  "market") 
contingent dollars  that will  be  delivered at  the  end of  the period.  The 
contingencies are  on  the realizations of  the aggregate  shock,  (St),  the 
-
(idiosyncratic)  market at which  the buyer participates  (jt)  and  the 
- (idiosyncratic)  type  of  the buyer  (tt). 17 
The  price of  a  dollar that will  be  delivered if the realization of 
- - - (St,jt,1t)  is  (s,j,1)  is denoted by nt(s,j,1)  and  the  number  of  dollars 
that will  be  delivered in this case is St(S,j,1).  Note  that St(S,j,1)  is 
defined only  for  s  ~ j.  For notational  convenience  we  set St(S,j,1)  = 0 
for  s  <  j.  The  total cost of  these contingent  claims  is thus, 
LsLj~ nt(s,j,1)St(S,j,1).  The  amount  of money  that  the household carries 
after the  end  of  transactions at the  securities market  is: 
(22)  BDt 
After  the  end of  trade  in the securities market,  one  member  of  the 
household goes  to work  (the worker)  and  the  other member  goes  to  the 
bank  (the  buyer).  At  the  bank,  the buyer  learns his  type,  1,  and  chooses 
the  amount  of  spendable dollars,  SDt(1). 
After  the  end of bank  transactions buyers  go  to their shopping 
island  (non-travelers stay in their island of origin and travelers  go  to 
the other island).  In each island,  buyers  form  a  line.  The  place of  an 
individual  buyer  in the  line is  exogenously determined by an i.i.d. 
lottery.  Buyers  arrive at the  goods  market  sequentially according to 
their place  in line.  Buyers  cannot resell goods. 
Upon  arrival at the market-place,  buyers  find  out  the  lowest 
price,  Pt(j),  at which  goods  are still available.  They  thus  learn that 
they participate in market  j.  A  buyer  of  type 1  who  participates in 
market  j,  chooses  to  spend Et(j,1)  dollars which  buy: 
(23 )  Ct(j,1) 18 
units  of  consumption.  The  money  in advance  constraint is: 
(24) 
The  asset transition equation  for  the  household is: 
(25)  At+l(S,j,'t) 
(l+iBDt)EDt  - iSDt('t)SDt('tt)  - Et(j,'t)  +  St(s,j,'t), 
where  i BDt  and  i SDt  are  shadow interest rates:  i BDt  is the interest 
applicable  to  EDt  and  iSDt('tt)  is  the  interest cost of  a  spendable 
dollar,  which  is  type  dependent. 
The  household  chooses  St(s,j,'t),  SDt('t)  and  Et(j,'t)  to maximize 
the  expected value  of  (21)  with  respect  to  (22)  - (25).  A  dynamic 
programming  formulation of  the household's  maximization problem is in 
Appendix  A.  We  now  turn to specify the  shadow interest rates  as  a 
function  of  the bank's  rates:  i L,  iT  and  i D. 
The  shadow  interest rates: 
The  shadow  interest rate on  ED  can  be  computed  by holding  SD 
constant and  adding  a  dollar to  ED.  If the  buyer  borrows  from  the  bank 
(SD>  ED),  a  dollar added  to  ED  will  reduce  the  amount  of  loans  by  one 
dollar and will  cut  the  interest cost  by  i L .  If he  does  not  borrow,  a 
dollar  added  to  ED  will  simply be  deposited at the  interest  iT  =  i L . 
Thus,  the  shadow interest rate applicable  to  ED  is:  iBD  i L . 
We  now  turn to specify the  interest cost of  a  spendable dollar. 
For  type  2  consumers,  SD  =  0  and  the specification of  the  interest cost 19 
is superfluous.  For  types  1  and  0  the  interest cost  depends  on  the  exact 
specification of  the  money  in advance  constraint  for  travelers  and non-
travelers. 
The  (generic)  buyer  chooses  the  amount  of  loans,  II,  and allocates 
the total of  BD  +  11  between  cash,  cu,  demand  deposits,  dd,  and  time 
deposits,  td.  Thus, 
(26)  cu  +  dd  +  td  BD  +  11. 
A  buyer  who  travels must  satisfy the  cash-in-advance constraint: 
(27)  E  ~ cu  , 
where  E  is  the  nominal  expenditures  on  goods.  A  buyer  who  does  not 
travel,  must  satisfy the less stringent constraint: 
(28)  E  ~ cu  +  dd. 
The  money  in advance  constraint  (24)  takes  the  form  in  (27)  for  a 
traveler and  (28)  for  a  non-traveler.  Accordingly,  the  amount  of 
spendable  dollars,  SD,  is the right hand  side of  (27)  for  a  traveler and 
of  (28)  for  a  non-traveler. 
A  traveler who  wants  to  add  a  dollar  to  the  spendable  amount  and 
has  no  time  deposits  (SD  ~ BD)  will  have  to  borrow  the additional  dollar 
and  add it to cash.  The  interest cost is  i L.  If he  has  time  deposits 
(SD  <  BD),  he will withdraw  the dollar  from  time  deposits  and  loose  i L . 
Thus,  i SD (l)  = i L.  A  non-traveler who  wants  to  add  a  dollar  to his 20 
spendable  amount,  will  take  a  loan and deposit  the dollar in a  checkable 
account  if SD  ~ BD.  The  net interest cost  for  doing  that is  iL  - i D.  If 
SD  <  BD  he will  transfer  the dollar  from  time  to  demand  deposits  and 
the interest cost is also  iL  - i D.  Thus, 
(29) 
This  difference  in the  shadow price of  a  spendable dollar  turns  out  to 
be  crucial  for  generating endogenous  fluctuations  in Mi. 
3.5  Equilibrium 
-
We  assume  that when  $  = $s  the  first  s  markets  open.  The  amount  of 
money  that will  be  spent  in each market  is determined endogenously in 
the  following  way. 
Assuming  that  the  fraction of  travelers  and non-travelers  is the 
-
same  in all markets,  total amount  of  expenditures per seller if $  = $s 
is given by: 
(30 )  TE(s)  (1  - ex)  [$sLj$sE(j,O)  +  (1  - $s)Lj$sE(j,l)]. 
Without  loss  of generality,  we  assume  E(j,O)  ~ E(j,l).  (Otherwise  we 
redefine  indices).  This  implies:  TE(s)  ~ TE(s+l). 
We  say that  the minimum  amount  of dollars  that will arrive,  TE(l), 
are  spent  in market  1.  If more  than  TE(l)  dollars arrive,  then market  2 
opens.  If more  than  TE(2)  dollars arrive,  then market  3  opens  and  so  on. 
The  nominal  demand per seller in market sis: 21 
(31)  ~  (s)  TE(s}  - TE(s-l}, 
where  we  set:  TE(O}  = o. 
Note  that  the  amount  of dollars  that will  be  spent  in each market 
is endogenous  and  depends  on  the choices  of  E(s,~}.  In the  special case 
in which  E(j,O}  = E(j,l}  for all j,  TE(s}  = TE(l}  for all sand 
~(s)  =  0  for all  s  >  1.  This  case of  full  capacity utilization occurs 
when  the average  reserve ratio,  rr,  is unity,  because  in this case  (20) 
implies  that  iD  =  0  and  (29)  implies  iSD(O}  =  i SD (l}  i L.  However,  if 
E(j,O}  >  E(j,l}  for all j,  then  ~(s)  >  0  for all s. 
The  probability that  a  dollar will be  spent at market  j  when 
exactly s  markets  open is: 
(32) 
(33) 
s.  u. 
J 
Market  clearing requires: 
~(j) /TE(s}. 
~(s)  P(s}k(s},  for all s. 
We  assume  that  the  representative household starts with  a  nominal 
wealth A  =  H,  where  H  is outside money  and define  equilibrium as 
follows. 
A  stationary symmetric  equilibrium for  the  reserve  requirement  rr 
(0  ~ rr  ~ I)  and  A  = H,  is a  vector  [W,  ns ,  P(s} I  k(s} I  y(s},  i L,  i D, 
iT'  iSD(~}'  LL(s},  TD(s},  DD(s},  z(s},  L,  T,  D,  Y,  Z,  n(s,j,~},  S(s,j,~}, 22 
BD,  SD ('t),  E (j , 't),  ~  (s) , 
s 
U j ,  A'(s,j,'t);  s,j  1, ...  , S ;  and  't  0,1,2] 
such  that: 
(a)  ~(s)  and  u~ satisfy  (30)  - (32),  y(s),  z(s)  are defined by  (13)  and 
] 
(15);  Y  is defined by  (10);  L,  T,  D,  Z  are defined by  (16),  isD('t) 
satisfy  (29)  and A' (s,j,'t)  =  (l+iL )BD  - isD('t)SD('t)  - E(j,'t)  +  ~(s,j,'t). 
(b)  Maximizing  behavior 
Given  (W,  n(s,j,'t),  i L,  i D,  P(s),  Y,  Z)  the quantities  ~(s,j,'t),  BD, 
SD('t) ,  E(j,'t)  solve  the  household's  maximization problem  (maximizing  the 
expected value  of  (21)  subject  to  (18)-(25):  see Appendix  A  for  a 
complete  dynamic  programming  formulation); 
Given  (W,  ns ,  P(s)),  the quantities  1  and  k(s)  solve  the  firm's  problem 
(14) ; 
Given  (iL ,  i D,  iT)  the  expecte'd quantities  (L,  D,  T)  solve  the bank's 
problem  (18). 
(c)  Market  clearing 
Securities: 
s 
L.j:<;s  Uj  [(I-a)<!>s~(s,j,O)  +  (I-a) (l-<!>s)~(s,j,l)+  a~(s,j,2)1 
= z(s)  +  y(s),  for all S; 
The  left hand  side is  the  total  amount  of dollars  claimed when  s  markets 
open  and  the  right hand side is  the  supply of dollars  in this  case. 
Money: 23 
BD  = H; 
Lj:SS  U;[(l-a)<I>sA' (s,j,O)  +  (l-a) (l-<Ps)A'{s,j,l)  +  aA'{s,j,2)]  H, 
for all s; 
This  says  that  H will  always  be willingly held.  The  first requirement 
insures  that  H  is willingly held after the  end  of  transactions  in the 
securities market.  The  second  requirement  insures  that outside money  is 
willingly held by  the household at the  end  of  the period.  (The  first 
order  conditions  for  the  banks  and  the  travelers  insure that money  is 
willingly held during  the period) . 
Banks: 
LL{s) 
DD{s) 
TD{s) 
(1  - a) [<psmax{O,  SD{O)  - H}  +  (1  - <ps)max{O,  SD{l)  - H}]; 
<l>s  (1  - a) SD (O) ; 
aH  +  (1  - a) {<I>smax { 0,  'H  - SD ( 0 ))  +  (1  - <Ps) max { 0,  H  - SD ( 1) ) } 
On  the left hand  side are banks'  supplies.  On  the  right hand  side are 
aggregate  demands.  Since non-consumers  do  not  take  loans  we  aggregate 
the  demand  for  loans  of  types °  and  1  only  (first condition).  Since 
iT  ~  i D,  travelers use  time  deposits  rather  than  demand  deposits,  in 
case  they choose  SD  <  BD.  Therefore,  only non-travelers  use  checkable 
deposits  (second condition).  The  last condition aggregates  demand  for 
time  deposits  over all types. 
Goods:  L1{s)  P{s)k{s),  for all s; 
Markets  which  are  opened are cleared. 24 
Labor:  I  1. 
Stationarity of wealth distribution: 
A' (s,j,'t)  H  for all s,  j,  'to 
In Appendix  B  we  show  the  following main results. 
Proposition 1:  There exists  a  unique  stationary symmetric  equilibrium. 
Proposition 2:  The  allocation obtained when rr  1  is Pareto efficient. S 
The  intuition for  the  second result is that setting rr =  1 
eliminates  the  endogenous  fluctuations  in M1  and  leads  to  full  capacity 
utilization.  In detail,  when  rr =  1,  io  =  0  and  iso(O)  =  i so(l)  =  i L. 
Therefore,  E(j,O)  =  E(j,l)  for all j,  TE(s)  =  TE(l)  for all sand 
d(s)  = 0  for all  s  >  1.  Market  clearing implies  that all the  capacity 
is supplied to  the first market  and  since this market  always  open, 
capacity is fully utilized.  When  rr <  1,  io  >  0  and 
iL'  In this case,  E(j,O)  >  E(j,l)  for all j, 
and d(s)  >  0  for all s.  Strictly positive capacity will  be  supplied to 
all markets  and capacity in markets  which  do  not  open is wasted. 
S  This  result uses  the  assumption  that labor  supply is inelastic. 
Otherwise,  the  Friedman  zero nominal  interest rate rule is required to 
achieve efficiency. 25 
4.  THE  EFFECT  OF  CREDIT  CARDS 
We  view credit cards  as  a  way  of  circumventing  the money-in-
advance  constraint:  A  buyer with  a  credit card  (a  credit buyer)  does  all 
payments  using  the card and  then,  at the  end  of  the period,  he  uses  time 
deposits  to  cover  the debt. 6 
Shocks  to  the number  of credit card users  cause  "velocity shocks" 
which are analogous  to  the  shocks  generated by changes  in the  currency 
to deposits  ratio.  To  illustrate,  we  adapt  the  above  UST  model  to allow 
for  credit buyers.  There are  three  types  of  households  characterized by 
their desire  to  consume  and  the credit status of  the buyer.  The  buyer  is 
of  type  0  if he  wants  to  consume  and is creditworthy.  The  buyer  is of 
type  1  if he  wants  to  consume  and is not  creditworthy and  the  buyer  is 
of  type  2  if he  does  not  want  to  consume.  As  before,  we  assume  that  a 
constant  fraction,  a,  of  the hbuseholds  are non-consumers. 
To  simplify we  assume  that all buyers  can use  checks  so  that  cash 
is not used.  We  also simplify by  assuming  that creditworthiness  is 
-
assigned arbitrarily at  the  bank:  A  random  fraction  ~ of  the households 
which  consume,  are creditworthy.  The  identity of  the households  who 
belong  to each  type  is determined every period,  at  the  bank,  by an 
i.i.d.  10ttery.7 The  bank  can observe  the  type  of  each buyer  and 
supplies credit cards  only to buyers  who  are  creditworthy. 
6  Note  that unlike  Lucas  and  Stokey  (1987),  here  the ability to  use 
credit is  a  characteristic of  a  buyer,  rather than of  a  good. 
7  Creditworthiness  is actually determined  on  the basis  of past behavior. 
For  our purpose,  it is  enough  that  there  be  some  random  element  in the 
process  of  determining creditworthiness. 26 
Since  a  credit buyer pays at the  end  of  the period,  the  interest 
cost of  a  spendable dollar is  zero  for  this  type  of buyer  (iSD(O)  =  0)8. 
The  interest cost of  the non-creditworthy buyer is the  same  as  for  the  a 
check user in the previous  section  (iSD(l)  =  iL  - i D). 
As  before  the interest cost differential will  lead to different 
expenditure  functions  E(j,  ~)  and  therefore to uncertainty about  total 
demand.  This will  lead to strictly positive demand  (A  in equation  [31]) 
in markets  with  s  >  1  and  to less  than full capacity utilization. 
Thus  random  number  of credit buyers  may  generate velocity shocks 
which  may  lead to waste.  When  cash is not used,  we  can increase capacity 
utilization by choosing  low rr.  This will  reduce  the  interest cost to 
the non-creditworthy buyers.  At  the limit,  with  zero  reserve 
requirement,  the  interest cost is  i SD(l)  =  iL  - iD  =  0  and all the 
demand  is in the first market.  However  in this case  the price level 
cannot  be  determined. 
When  cash is used,  the only way  to  achieve  full  capacity 
utilization is by prohibiting the use  of credit cards  (and allow only 
the use of debit cards  which  do  not  circumvent  the money-in-advance 
constraint).  Otherwise,  there is  a  tradeoff between  random  fluctuations 
in nominal  demand  which  stem  from  changes  in the  number  of credit users 
and  fluctuations  which  stem  from  changes  in the  number  of  cash users. 
When  rr is reduced,  the  first source  of  fluctuations  becomes  less 
important but  the  second source gains  importance.  To  minimize  random 
8  The  calculation of  this interest cost is analogous  to  the caluclation 
of  the interest cost of  a  spendable dollar to  the non-traveler in the 
previous  section,  where  iT  replaces  iD  in  (29). 27 
fluctuations  in nominal  demand,  it is  likely that an  interior reserve 
requirement  (0  <  rr <  1)  should be  chosen. 
5.  DISCUSSION 
We  have  shown  that if the money-in-advance constraint is 
universally applicable  then  the  Friedman case  for  a  100%  reserve 
requirement  on  checkable  accounts  is  justifiable. 
To  understand Friedman's  position it is useful  to distinguish 
between  the  individual  and  the social points  of view,  regarding the 
creation of real balances. 9  While  from  the  individual point  of view 
banks  alleviate the money-in-advance constraint,  from  the social point 
of  view  they do  not:  The  increase  in inside money  simply increases  the 
price level.  Moreover,  we  have  shown  that when  the money-in-advance 
constraint is universally applicable,  reserve  requirements  on  checkable 
accounts  have  no  effect on  intermediation which  is done  by the use  of 
time  deposits. 
We  have  also  shown  that  endogenous  fluctuations  in M1  lead to 
fluctuations  in output,  as  argued by  Friedman.  In our  UST  model 
fluctuations  in the  currency/deposit ratio create endogenous  monetary 
shocks.  These  fluctuations  are non-neutral here  for  the  same  reason that 
fluctuations  in the money  supply are non-neutral  in other  UST  models: 
actual  trade  occurs  before all the  information about  the current money 
supply and  demand  is revealed.  To  insure  full  capacity utilization, 
sellers must  know  the  current  demand.  In our model,  this  is achieved by 
9  This  distinction is present in Friedman  (1959)  and  Friedman  (1969). 28 
imposing  a  100%  reserve  requirement  which  eliminates  the  endogenous 
fluctuations  in the money  supply. 
However,  when  the  nominal  interest rate is positive,  there are 
incentives  to  circumvent  the money-in-advance  constraint.  The  use  of 
credit cards  is  a  good  example.  We  view credit cards  as  allowing buyers 
to use  time  deposits  to  buy  goods.  In general,  there will  be  three  types 
of buyers:  cash users,  check users  and credit users.  And  there will  be  a 
difference  in the  interest cost of  consumption which  cannot  be entirely 
eliminated.  If we  adopt  the  100%  reserve  requirement  we  eliminate  the 
cost difference between  cash users  and  check users but maximize  the  cost 
difference between  these  two  types  and credit users.  A  0%  reserve 
requirement  (if possible)  will eliminate  the  difference  in cost between 
credit users  and  check users  but  cash users will pay more. 10 
In our  UST  model,  prohibiting the use  of credit cards  combined 
with the  100%  reserve  requirem~nt, will  ensure  full capacity 
utilization.  But it is not  clear whether  such regulations  can be 
enforced. 
This  is not  a  problem at the  Friedman  zero  nominal  interest rate 
rule because at  zero  nominal  interest rate  there are  no  incentives  to 
circumvent  the  money-in-advance  constraint.  However,  other problems  may 
arise.  If the  fraction of  non-consumers  (a)  is  random,  then at  the 
Friedman rule  there will be  uncertainty about  nominal  demand  because 
non-consumers  will  have  no  incentive  to  lend money  which  they do  not 
10  It is possible that  the  observed recent  reductions  in reserve 
requirements  can be  explained by  the  growing  importance  of  credit card 
transactions. 29 
plan to  spend.  In  a  UST  environment,  this uncertainty leads  to waste.  It 
may  thus  be  desirable  to have  a  small positive nominal  interest rate.  In 
this  case,  the  non-consumers  will  lend their money  and  the  amount  of 
money which arrives at the  goods  market  (under  100%  reserve  requirement) 
is non  random.  (See  related arguments  in Eden  [1986]  and Williamson 
[1996]).  But  as  was  mentioned before,  there will be  incentives  to  use 
credit cards  for  circumventing  the money-in-advance  constraint. 
We  may  therefore say that  UST  models  which  incorporate the money-
in-advance  constraint  do  not  give  unambiguous  support  for  the  Friedman 
zero nominal  interest rate rule nor  to  the  100%  reserve requirement. 
Still these models  provide  a  framework  for  analyzing  the  relevant 
tradeoffs  associated with  the choice  of  reserve requirements  and  nominal 
interest rate. 
Other models  have  been used  to discuss  reserve  requirements. 
Sargent  and Wallace  (1982)  argue against  the  imposition of  any legal 
restrictions  on  the  operation of banks.  They  argue  for  the elimination 
of all interest rate differentials.  However,  Sargent  and Wallace  have 
only one  type  of  deposits.  Therefore  they do  not  make  the distinction 
between  time  and  demand  deposits  which  we  argue  is crucial. 
The  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983)  model  has  also been used to make  a 
case against  imposing  (100%)  reserve requirements.  In their model  demand 
deposits  serve  agents  who  are not  sure  about  the  timing of  their 
consumption.  Accordingly,  the  Diamond-Dybvig  definition of  demand 
deposits  is different  from  ours.  They  emphasize  the  flexible maturity 
(the ability to withdraw  a  known  quantity of  cash upon  demand)  aspect  of 
these  accounts while we  emphasize  the circulating debt  (the ability to 
use  these accounts  for writing checks  and satisfy the money  in advance 30 
constraint)  aspect.  The  risk pooling role of  the  Diamond-Dybvig  banks 
can be  performed by other  financial  institutions as  argued by Jacklin 
(1987).  We  therefore think that  the main distinguishing  feature  of  banks 
is in the creation of circulating debt  and not  the  creation of  flexible 
maturity debt. 31 
APPENDIX  A 
Dynamic  programming  formulation 
Here  we  specify the  dynamic  programming  problem  faced  by the 
household. 
There  are three sessions  of  trade.  At  the first session there is 
trade in securities and  labor.  The  household brings  from  the previous 
period a  nominal  wealth A,  and after completion of  transactions 
(choosing  S,  receiving profits  from  the  firm and  the  bank,  and selling 
labor)  its wealth at the  end  of  the period is:  Al  dollars.  The  buyer 
then goes  to  the bank  and  chooses  SD,  which  changes  his wealth  to  A2. 
Finally,  the buyer  goes  to  the  goods  market  and .chooses  E,  changing  the 
wealth to  A3  which is carried over  to  the next period as A'.  Thus,  Ai-l 
denotes  the  (random,  end of period)  wealth at the beginning of  session 
i.  We  use  Vi  to  denote  the  maximum  expected utility in session i,  which 
depends  on Ai-l. 
Using  the  logic of  dynamic  programming  we  start from  the last 
session. 
At  the  goods  market: 
We  use A2(S,j,1)  to denote  the  end of period wealth of  the 
household at  the  beginning of  trade  in the  goods  market  j.  This  value 
-
depends  on  the yet  unknown  realization of  s  and  the  indices  j  and 1 
(which  are  known  at this  stage)  because  contracts  signed at previous 
-
stages  are contingent  on  these variables.  Note  that A2(S,j,1)  is defined 
only for  realizations  s  ~ j.  For  notational  convenience  we  set 32 
A2(S,j,~)  =  0  for  s  <  j.  The  same  convention is adopted below  for 
similar cases. 
We  use  the vector: 
-
possible realizations  of  A2(S,j,~).  The  buyer  faces  the price P(j)  and 
chooses  to  spend  E(j,~)  dollars  subject  to  the  constraint: 
E(j,~)  ~  SD(~).  The  end  of  period nominal  wealth after spending  is given 
- - by A'  (s,j,~)  =  A2(S,j,~)  - E(j,~).  This  amount  yields next  period the 
-
expected utility EV(A '  (s,j,~)).  We  require  that bankcruptcies  do  not 
occur  so  that  A'  (s,j,~)  is positive. 
The  buyer  who  found  out his  type  in the previous  stage,  has  used 
Bayes  law  to update  the probability of state s  in a  way  which will  be 
described below.  As  a  result,  buyer  of  type  ~ assigns  the probability 
-
ns(~)  to  the  event:  ~ = ~s.  When  the  buyer  finds  that he participates  in 
market  j  and that  s  ~ j,  he  updates  the probability again: 
Prob(s 
the  buyer  chooses  E(j,~)  to  solve: 
max  {eu(E(j,~)/P(j))  +  ~Ls~j  (ns(~)/qj)V(A' (s,j,~))} 
s.t 
o  ~  E(j,~)  ~  SD(~) 
A  I  (s, j  ,~)  = A2 (s, j  ,~)  - E (j ,~)  ~ 0 . 
At  the  bank: 33 
When  the buyer  learns his  type,  he uses  Bayes  rule to update  the 
probability that  $  =  $s.  This  probability conditional  on~, is: 
(A2) 
1ts (l)  [(Os (l-$s)) /  (1-",))  and  1ts (2) 
where", = Lsns$s is the probability of being  a  non-traveler given 
e = 1.11 
Before  transacting at the bank,  the  end of period wealth is 
- -
Al(S,j,~).  After  the  completion of  transactions at the bank,  the  end of 
period wealth is: 
(A3)  A2(s,j,~) 
At  the  goods  market,  the expected utility of  the household which 
participates  in market  j  is:  V3(A2(.,j,~),SD(~),j).  However,  at the 
- banking stage,  j  is still a  random variable.  To  compute  expectations,  we 
use  u~ to denote  the probability that  the buyer will participate in 
J 
market  j  given that  s  ~ j  markets  open.  Using  this notation the 
probability that  a  buyer  of  type  ~ assigns  to  the event  that he will 
s  participate in market  j  is given by fj(t)  =  [Ls~j  Uj1ts(~)).  (Note  that 
the  index  j  is not  relevant  for  type  2  but  we  include it for notational 
convenience).  Therefore  the  maximum  expected utility at the beginning of 
the  third session is: 
11  For  example, 
prob(~ = $sl  ~ = 0)  O})  /prob(~ =  0) 34 
- -
EV3 (A2 ( ° , j , 't) , SD ('t) , j)  = l:j  f j  ('t) v3 (A2  ( ° , j , 't) , SD ('t) , j ) . 
At  the  bank,  the buyer  chooses  SD  ~  0  to  solve: 
(A4) 
s.t.  (A3), 
where  AI(o,o,'t)  is  the matrix of all possible realizations of 
At  the securities market: 
The  household starts with A  dollars  and after receiving  the 
profits  from  the  firm and  the bank  and  selling labor it has 
A  +  Y  +  Z  +  W dollars.  It then chooses  BD  and  S  out  of  the budget 
constraint  (22)  in the  text  to maximize  the  expected value of 
V2(AI(o,o,'t),  't).  The  shadow interest rate  for  BD  is  iL  and  therefore 
the asset transition equation is: 
(A5) 
Before  learning its type,  the  household chooses  S(s,j,'t)  to maximize 
EV2(AI(o,o,'t),  't)l.  The  household  thus  solves: 
(A6)  V(A) 
+  aV2 (AI ( ° , 0,2),  2) 
s.t.  (22)  in the  text  and  (AS), 35 
where  as  before  0/  denotes  the probability that  a  buyer will not  travel 
given that he wants  to  consume. 
Existence  and Characterization of equilibrium 
We  start by valuing an additional do.llar at the beginning of  the 
period under  the assumption  that an equilibrium exists.  This  is: 
(A7)  V' (A)  = 
LsnsLj~s U~{(l - a)<pS{~iDV'(A'(s,j,O))  +  u'(E(j,O)/P(j))/P(j)} 
+  (1  - a) (l-<ps)u' (E(j,l)/P(j))/P(j) 
+  a~(1 + i L ) V' (A' (s, j  , 2 ) ) } 
This  follows  from  the  envelope  argument  applied to  (A6).  The 
intuition is as  follows. 
A  type  0  buyer  cannot  do  better than deposit  the dollar in a 
checkable  account  and spend it. This  follows  from  the  fact  that we  have 
an interior solution.  In detail,  spending  the dollar  on  consumption will 
be  the strictly preferred option in case  the money-in-advance constraint 
is binding.  Since  the buyer  always  buys  a  strictly positive amount  of 
consumption,  when  the money-in-advance constraint is not binding  the 
buyer  is  indifferent between  spending  the dollar on  consumption and 
carrying it over  to  the next period.  So  in either case  we  may  assume 
that the dollar is spent  on  consumption.  Since  the dollar is deposited, 
the end of period wealth increases  by  iD  dollars  due  to  the interest on 
demand deposits  and this  is valued by:  ~iDV' (A' (s,j,O)).  Since  the  event 36 
{8  =  1,  s  markets  open,  and  the buyer  is  a  non-traveler who  participates 
s 
in market  j  ~ s}  occurs  with probability TIsu.(l  - a)~s'  the  second  line 
] 
in  (A7)  is the  total value of  the  additional dollar to  a  non-traveler. 
A  type  1  buyer will  take  the dollar as  cash and  spend it.  Since 
the  event  {8  1,  s  markets  open  and  the buyer  is  a  traveler who 
participates  in market  j  ~ s}  occurs with probability 
s  TIsu.(l  - a) (1  - ~s)'  the value  from  doing it is  the  third line of  (A7). 
] 
A  type  2  buyer will deposit  the dollar in a  time  deposit at an 
interest rate  i L.  His  end  of period wealth increases  by  (1  +  iLl  dollars 
and his  expected utility by  ~(1  +  iL)V' (A' (s,j,2).  Since  the  event 
{8  = 0,  s  markets  open,  and  the buyer  (fictitiously)  participates  in 
s 
market  j  ~ s}  occurs  with probability aTIsu.,  the last expression under 
] 
the  summation  on  the  right hand side of  (A7)  is the value of  an 
additional dollar to  a  type  2  buyer. 
Since  u  is concave,  it c'an  be  shown  (following  Stokey and  Lucas 
[1989))  that V(A)  is concave.  Concavity and  the market  clearing 
condition: 
LjU~[(1-a)~sA' (s,j,O)  +  (1-0.)  (l-~s)A' (s,j,l)  +  aA' (s,j,2))  = H  for all  s 
] 
leads  to stationarity:  A' (S,j,1)  = H  for  all s,  j,  1.  This  follows  from 
the  fact  that  the  sum  of  the weights  in the  above  market  clearing 
condition is unity:  LjU~ [(1-a)~s  +  (1-0.)  (l-~s)  +  a)  =  1,  for  all  s. 
] 
Stationarity and  (A7)  imply: 
(A8)  V'(H)  = 
LsTIsLj:::;sU~{~sU' (E(j,O)/P(j)) [l/P(j))  +  (l-~s)u' (E(j,l)/P(j)) [l/P(j)]}/I, 
where  I  [1  - a~(1 + iLl  - (1  - (X)  iD~\jf) /  (1  - a). 37 
Next  we  use  the first order conditions  that govern  the choice of 
SD(~)  to  show  that in equilibrium: 
(A9)  kS1tS(~)kjS;S uj  u'(E(j,~)/P(j))[l/P(j)]  =  ~[1  +  iSD('t)]V'(H). 
Condition  (A9)  uses  the  following  reasoning.  At  the  optimum the  buyer  is 
indifferent between taking an additional  spendable dollar and actually 
spending it to not  doing  so  (this is true even when  he  is not 
constrained by the money  in advance constraint,  see  the reasoning  for 
(A7)).  If he  spends  an additional dollar he will get  the additional 
expected utility from  consumption calculated by  the left hand  side of 
(A9).  The  cost of doing  so,  which is on  the right hand side of  (A9), 
arises  because  he will have  1  +  iSD(t)  dollars  less at the  end of  the 
period.  Consistency of  conditions  (A9)  and  (A8)  requires  (1  +  iLl  =  1/~. 
We  will argue  soon  that this must  hold in equilibrium. 
The  first order conditions  that govern the choice  of  E  in the 
goods  market  (invoking stationarity)  imply: 
(A10)  u'(E(j,t)/P(j))/P(j);:;  ~V'(H);  with equality if E(j,t)  <  SD(~). 
Stationarity and  the concavity of V(  )  imply nominal  prices which 
are actuarially fair: 
s 
(All)  n(s,j,O)  =  ~(1  - a)~snsu.; 
J 
s 
n(s,j,2)  =  ~ansu.; 
J 
n(s,j,l) 
The  absence  of  arbitrage opportunities  implies, 
s 
~(1  - a) (l-~s)nsu.; 
J 38 
(A12) 
To  see  why  (1  +  iLl  =  1/~,  note  that  the price of  a  dollar in the 
next period is Ls  ns  = ~  and  the  implied gross  interest rate in the 
securities market  is  1/~.  Suppose  now  that  (1  +  iLl  >  1/~.  Then  a 
household can choose  large  BD  by selling claims  on dollars  in the 
securities market  and deposit  (BD  - SD)  at the bank as  time deposits, 
making an unbounded  amount  of money with certainty.  If  (1  +  iLl  <  1/~, 
it will choose  large negative  BD  by buying claims  on dollars  and  take 
loans  from  the bank to get  the desired level of  SD. 
From  (13)  in the  text and  (A12)  it follows  immediately that: 
(A13)  iL  - iD  =  rr(~-l - 1). 
Thus,  the interest spread is increasing in the reserve requirement,  rr. 
The  first order condition for  an interior solution to  the  firm's 
problem  (14),  implies: 
(A14)  P(l)  W/~. 
In Appendix  B  we  use  the  above  result to  show  that: 
Proposition 1:  There exists  a  unique  stationary symmetric  equilibrium. 
We  now  turn to discuss  the optimal  choice of reserve requirements. 
We  first  show, 39 
Claim  1:  If  SD(1)  ~ SD(1'),  then  E(j,1)  ~  E(j,1')  and vice versa. 
This  follows  from  (A10). 
Claim  2:  When  rr  <  1,  SD(l)  <  SD(O). 
To  show  this  Claim,  suppose  SD(l)  ~ SD(O).  Then E(j,l)  ~  E(j,O)  by 
Claim 1.  It follows  that travelers  spend more  both  on  consumption  and  on 
interest than non-travelers.  Since prices are actuarially fair  (see, 
[All])  the strategy of  consuming  more  when  traveling is worse  than  a 
strategy of  consuming  an  amount  that does  not  depend  on  the traveling 
status.  To  see  this point,  note  that if the mean  is the  same,  concavity 
of  u(  )  works  in favor  of  the alternative.  Moreover,  average  consumption 
is higher  under  the alternative' because interest costs,  i SD ,  are  lower. 
Thus,  by contradiction,  SD(l)  <  SD(O). 
When  rr = 1,  (20)  implies  iD  =  0  and  (29)  implies  that both  types 
face  the  same  shadow interest rate for  SD:  iSD(O) 
Therefore, 
Claim  3:  When  rr  1,  SD(l)  SD(O)  and  E(s,O) 
This  leads  to: 
Proposition  2:  The  allocation obtained when  rr 
E(s,l)  for all s. 
1  is  Pareto efficient. 40 
When  rr = 1,  Claim  3  and  the  definitions of  ~ in  (31)  imply  that 
only the  first market  is active.  Therefore,  in equilibrium k(l)  = 1, 
k(s)  o for all s  >  1.  Consumption per household  is unity and  does  not 
depend  on  the  traveling status. 41 
APPENDIX  B 
We  compute  a  stationary and  symmetric  equilibrium in the  following 
way.  We  first arbitrarily choose  a  vector  SD  =  [SD(O),  SD(l)]  and 
compute prices,  consumption  and  the marginal  utility of  a  dollar as 
functions  of  SD.  We  then use  these  functions  to  solve  for  a  vector  SD 
that satisfies  the  first order conditions at the banking  session.  It 
turns  out  that if SD  is  a  solution then  ASD  is also  a  solution for all 
A  >  O.  We  use  the  reserve  requirement  and  BD  = H,  to scale the  SD  vector 
and  to  show  the existence of  a  unique  stationary and  symmetric 
equilibrium. 
Proof  of  Proposition  1 
We  first define equilibrium in the  goods  market  for  a  given vector 
SD  [ SD ( 0),  SD ( 1 ) ] . 
The  vector  [( P (1) , ...  , P (S),  k (1) , ...  , k (S),  E (0,1) , ...  , E (0, S) , 
E(l,l), ... ,E(l,S),  u~,  V']  is an  equilibrium in the  goods  market  if: 
J 
(Bl) 
(B2) 
(B3 ) 
(B4) 
(B5) 
(B6) 
qsP(s)  = P(l) 
LS  k(s)  = 1 
L1(s)/P(s)  k(s),  where  L1(s)  is  from  (31)  in the  text; 
u ' (E(j,1:)/P(j))/P(j) 
E (j ,1:)  ~  SD (1:) 
~  ~V'  with equality if E(j,1:)  < 
u ~ { (l-<\>s) u  I  (E (j , 1) / P (j ) ) / P (j)  + 
J 
<\>s u  I  (E (j , 0) / P (j ) ) / P ( j  ) } / r; 
SD (1:)  . 42 
where  (after substituting  [A12])  r  1  - iD~o/'  and  u~ is given by  (32) 
] 
in the  text. 
Claim Bl:  For  any  SD  >  0,  there exists  a  unique  equilibrium in the 
goods  market:  [(P(liSD), ...  ,P(SiSD),  k(liSD), .•• ,k(SiSD), 
s 
E ( 0 , 1 i SD)  , ...  , E ( 0 , S i SD),  E ( 1 , 1 i SD) , ...  , E ( 1 , S i SD),  u. (SD),  V I  (SD) ] . 
] 
Proof:  Let  p  denote  the expected revenue per unit in the goods  market. 
We  choose  p  >  0  arbitrarily and set: 
(B7)  P(SiP) 
Lemma  Bl:  Given  SD  and p,  there exists  a  solution,  E(j,  ~i  SD,  p)  to: 
(BS)  u '  (E(j,~)/P(jiP))/P(jiP)  ~ 
~~sns~i~s U~{(l-.s)ul (E(i,l)/P(iip))/P(iiP) 
+.su' (E(i, 0) /P(iiP)) /P(iiP)}/r 
with equality if E(j,~)  <  SD(~). 
Note  that  to get  (BS)  we  substitute  (B6)  into  (B5)  and  therefore  (BS) 
insures  that both conditions  are satisfied.  To  show existence of  a 
solution to  (BS),  we  choose  K  as  our  guess  for  V'  and define: 
(B9)  K'  =  ~sns~j~s  U~{(l-.s)min[ul (SD(I)/P(j;p))/P(jip),  ~K]  + 
.smin [u  I  (SD (0) / P (j i p) ) / P ( j  i p),  ~K]}  /  (~n . 43 
If K is small  then  K'  = ~r >  K since r  <  1.  If K is sufficiently large, 
then K'  = ~sns~jSs  U~{(1-$s)U' (SD(l)/P(j;p))/P(j;p)  + 
$s  u' (SD (0) / P (j ; p) ) / P ( j ; p) } /  (~n  <  K. 
By continuity,  there exists  a  fixed point  K(SD,  p)  of  (B9).  Since  the 
mapping  is monotone,  K(SD,  p)  is unique. 
We  now  set E(j,  ~;  SD,  p)  =  SD(~)  for all  j  and  ~  such that: 
u' (SD(~)/P(j;p))/P(j;p)  ~  ~K(SD,  p).  Otherwise,  E(j,  ~;  SD,  p)  is given 
by the solution to:  u' (E(j,~)/P(j;p))/P(j;p) = ~K(SD,  p).  Thus  we  have 
shown  Lemma  B1. 
Let  TE(s;SD,p)  and  ~(s;SD,p)  be  defined by  (30)  and  (31)  when 
using E(j,  ~)  =  E(j,  ~;  SD,  p).  Then, 
Lemma  B2:  ~s  qs~(s;SD,p)/p is decreasing in p. 
To  show  this claim note  that: 
(a)  E(s,  ~;  ASD,  Ap)  = AE(s,  ~;  SD,  pI; 
(b)  E(s,  ~;  SD,  p)  is increasing in SD. 
From  the definition of  ~ in the  text  (31)  and  (a)  and  (b)  it 
follows  that: 
(a')  ~(S;ASD,Ap)  A~(s;SD,p); 
(b')  ~s  qs~(s;SD,p)  is increasing in  SD. 
From  (a')  and  (b')  we  get  for  A>  1: 
This  completes  the proof  of  Lemma  B2. 44 
To  continue with  the construction of  equilibrium in the  goods 
market,  we  note  that  the real  demand  in market  s  at the prices  P(SiP), 
is:  kd(SiP)  = ~(SiSD,p)/P(SiP) = qs~(SiSD,p)/p. The  total real  demand  is: 
Kd(P)  =  Ls  kd(SiP)  =  Ls  qs~(SiSD,p)/p.  Since total  supply is unity, 
market  clearing requires: 
(Bl0)  1. 
By  Lemma  B2,  Kd(p)  is continuously decreasing.  When  p  is arbitrarily 
large,  Kd  is arbitrarily small  and vice versa.  This  leads  to  a  unique 
solution of  the expected revenue  per unit:  p(SD).  We  can  now  compute 
equilibrium magnitudes.  This  completes  the proof  of  Claim Bl. 
To  compute  a  stationary symmetric  equilibrium we  use  the  following 
goods  market  equilibrium magni'tudes: 
P(SiSD)  = P(SiP(SD)) i 
E (j,  1: i SD)  = E (j,  1: i SD , P ( SD)  ) i 
V' (SD) 
s  u, (SD) 
] 
K ( SD ,  P ( SD) ) i 
~(jiSD,p(SD))/TE(SiSD,p(SD)) 
We  now  look  for  a  vector  SD  that will satisfy the  first order 
condition at the  banking  session,  given  P(SiSD),  E(j,  1:iSD)  and 
V' (SD).  We  denote  the  expected marginal utility of  a  dollar to  a  type  1: 
buyer,  given  that  s  markets  open  and  the dollar is actually spent,  by: 
(Bll)  X(s,1:,SD)  s 
Lj:::;s  u, (SD)  u' (E (j , 1: i SD) / P (j i SD)  ) / P (j i SD)  . 
] 45 
The  first order conditions at  the  banking  session  (A6)  are: 
(B12a)  LS [ (Os<Ps) 1'1'] X (s, 0, SD)  P(l  +  iSD(O) )V' (SD) 
(B12b)  LS [ (Os (l-<ps)) I (1-'1') ]X(s, I,  SD)  P(l  +  iSD(l) )V' (SD) 
Lemma  B3:  There exists  a  vector  SD  that solves  (B12). 
Note  that if  SD  solves  (B12)  then  ASD  is also  a  solution for  any  A 
>  O.  Note  also that  (B6)  is  a  linear combination of  (B12a)  and  (B12b). 
To  see  this multiply  (B12a)  by  'I'  and  (B12b)  by  (1-'1') and  add  the  two 
while using  (1  +  iLl  = liP,  to get  (B6),  which holds  by construction.  We 
can  therefore  look at a  single equation,  say  (B12a),  normalize  SD(l)  = 1 
and  solve  for  SD(O).  Let  us  rewrite  (B12a)  as: 
(B13 )  Ls [ (Os<Ps) 1'1'] X (s, 0, [SD (0),  1])  P (1  +  iSD (0) ) V' ( [SD (0),  1]). 
Note  that when  SD(O)  is  large,  the  consumption of  type  1  goes  to  zero 
and X(s,O, [SD(O),  1])  is  large because  we  assume:  u' (0)  =  ~.  Since V'  is 
a  linear combination of  X(s,O, [SD(O),  1])  and X(s,l, [SD(O),  1]),  it 
follows  that V'  is large.  In particular it is larger  than  the  LHS  of 
(B13).  The  opposite holds  when  SD(O)  is  small.  Thus  there exists  a 
solution:  SD  =  [SD(O),  1].  This  completes  the proof  of  Lemma  A3. 
We  now  scale  SD  to satisfy the  reserve  requirements.  For  this 
purpose,  we  characterize all combinations  of  SD  =  [SD(O),  SD(l)]  that 
satisfy the  reserve  requirement.  In equilibrium when  BD  = H,  the non-46 
consumers  (a  fraction  a  of  the population)  deposit  BD  in time  deposits. 
In addition,  consumers  deposit  any amount  beyond  SD  in time  deposits. 
Thus, 
(B14)  T  aH  +  (1  -a){o/max(O,  H  - SD(O))  +  (1  - o/)max(O,  H  - SD(l))}. 
Consumers  who  choose  SD(1:)  >  H,  take  loans and  therefore: 
(B15)  L  (1  - a)o/max(O,  SD(O)  - H)  +  (1  - a) (1  - o/)max(O,  SD(l)  - H). 
Only non-travelers use  demand  deposits  and  therefore: 
(B16)  D  (1  - a)o/SD(O) . 
In equilibrium there will be  no  excess  reserves  (on  average)  and 
therefore  (using  [17]  in the  text): 
(B17)  (1  - rr)D  +  T  L. 
substituting  (B14)-(B16)  into  (B17)  yields: 
(B18)  ~OSD(O)  +  ~lSD(l)  1. 
where,  ~O =  (1  - a)rro//H  i  ~1 =  (1  - a) (1  - o/)/H.  Thus  we  can  scale 
A 
the  solution  SD  by  l/(~OSD(O)  +  ~1)  to get  a  stationary symmetric 
equilibrium.  With  this  we  have  shown,  existence and uniqueness  of  a 
stationary symmetric  equilibrium. 47 
REFERENCES 
Robert J.  Barro.  Macroeconomics.  John Wiley  & Sons,  Inc.  4th edition, 
1993. 
Bental,  Benjamin  and Benjamin  Eden  "Money  and  Inventories  in an  Economy 
with Uncertain and  Sequential  Trade",  forthcoming  in the Journal 
of  Monetary Economics,  June  1996. 
V.V.Chari,  Larry E.Jones  and  Rodolfo  E.  Manuelli  "  The  Growth  Effects  of 
Monetary  Policy"  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Minneapolis,  Ouarterly 
Review,  Fall  1995  p.18-32. 
Diamond,  Douglas  W.,  and Dybvig,  Philip H.  "Bank  runs,  Deposit 
Insurance,  and Liquidity"  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  Vol.  91, 
401-19,  June  1983. 
Eden,  Benjamin.  "The Adjustment  of  Prices  to Monetary  Shocks  When  Trade 
is Uncertain and  Sequential"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  Vol. 
102,  No.3,  493-509,  June  1994. 
"Trading Uncertainty and  the Cash  in Advance  Constraint," 
Journal  of  Monetary  Economics,  1986,  18  ,  285-293. 
Friedman Milton.  A  Program  for  Monetary Stability,  Fordham University 
Press,  New  York  City 1959. 
The  Optimum Ouantity of Money  and  Other  Essays,  Chicago: 
Aldine  1969. 
Lucas,  Robert  E.,  Jr.  and  Stokey,  Nancy  L.  "Money  and  Interest  in a 
Cash-in-Advance  Economy"  Econometrica,  55,  1987,  491-513. 
Lucas,  Robert  E.,  Jr.  and Michael  Woodford  "Real  Effects  of Monetary 
Shocks  In an  Economy With  Sequential  Purchases"  Preliminary 
draft,  The  University of  Chicago,  April  1994. 
Stokey,  Nancy  L.  and  Lucas,  Robert  E.,  Jr.  (with  Edward  C.  Prescott) 
Recursive  Methods  in  Economic  Dynamics,  Harvard University 
Press,  1989. 
Williamson,  Stephen  D.  "Sequential Markets  and  the  Suboptimality of  the 
Friedman  rule"  forthcoming  in the  Journal  of Monetary  Economics, 
June  1996. CFS Working Paper Series: 
97/01  Jan P. Krahnen  Mutual Fund Performance and Market Share: 
Frank A. Schmid  Evidence from the German Market 
Erik Theissen 
97/02  Helmut Beeck  Value-at-Risk-Limitstrukturen zur Steuerung und 
Lutz Johanning  Begrenzung von Marktrisiken im Aktienbereich 
Bernd Rudolph 
97/03  Jan P. Krahnen  Messung individueller Risikoeinstellungen 
Christian Rieck 
Erik Theissen 
98/01  Dominique Demougin  A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule 
Claude Fluet 
98/02  Roel M. W. J. Beetsma  An Analysis of  the "Stability Pact" 
Harald Uhlig 
98/03  Anne C. Sibert  Monetary Regimes and Labour Market Reform 
Alan Sutherland 
98/04  Daniel Gros  EMU and Capital Markets 
98/05  RalfElsas  Is Relationship Lending Special? 
Jan Pieter Krahnen  Evidence from Credit-File Data in Germany 
98/06  RalfEwert  Determinants of  Bank Lending Performance 
Gerald Schenk 
98/07  Sabine Henke  Credit Securitization and Credit Derivatives: 
Hans-Peter Burghof  Financial Instruments and the Credit Risk 
Bernd Rudolph  Management of  Middle Market Commercial 
Loan Portfolios 
98/08  Achim Machauer  Bank Behavior Based on Internal Credit Ratings 
Martin Weber  of  Borrowers 
98/09  Jan Pieter Krahnen  Where Do We Stand in the Theory of  Finance? 
A Selective Overview with Reference to Erich 
Gutenberg 98/10  Ernst Maug  How Effective is Proxy Voting? 
Information Aggregation and Conflict Resolution 
in Corporate Voting Contests 
98/11  Adam Posen  Why EMU is Irrelevant for the German Economy 
98/12  Utpal Bhattacharya  When an Event is Not an Event: The Curious 
HazemDaouk  Case of  an Emerging Market 
Brian Jorgenson 
Carl-Heinrich Kehr 
98/13  Hans-Peter Burghof  Credit and Information in Universal Banking 
Claudia Henschel  - a Clinical Study 
98/14  RalfElsas  Empirical Analysis of  Credit Relationships in 
Sabine Henke  Small Firms Financing: Sampling Design and 
Achim Machauer  Descriptive Statistics 
Roland Rott 
Gerald Schenk 
98/15  Henrik Jensen  State Manipulation and Asymptotic Efficiency in 
Ben Lockwood  a Dynamic Model of  Monetary Policy 
98/16  Lars E.O. Svensson  Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule 
98/17  Gordon M. Bodnar  Derivatives Usage in Risk Management by U.S. 
Gunther Gebhardt  and German Non-Financial Firms: 
A Comparative Survey 
98/18  Benjamin Bental  The Real Effects of  Reserve Requirements 
Benjamin Eden 
Copies  of working  papers  are  available  (fee:  DM  10,-)  at  the  Institut  flir  Kapitalmarkt-
forschung - Center for Financial Studies or can be downloaded (http://www.ifk-cfs.de) StUB  Ffm 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
86613611 